**PIRACY TODAY**

**AN UPDATE**

At the Colloquium in Buenos Aires in October 2010, former President Patrick Griggs delivered an illuminating paper on piracy. The real scale of the issue had not perhaps been appreciated by all at that time. Piracy remains a major issue and I would like to bring delegates up to date.

The thesis of Patrick Griggs’s paper was that, although there were legal mechanisms for combating piracy, in principle, they were difficult to apply in practice for legal, practical and political reasons.

**The nature of the problem**

In International law the starting place is Part VII of UNCLOS. It is titled High Seas and includes provisions relating to piracy. Article 101 defines piracy as “*any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation*” committed on the high seas for private ends against another vessel or persons or property on board. Arts. 105, 106, 107, 110 and 111 allow warships and other authorised ships to stop, search and seize any vessel on the high seas that they have reasonable grounds for suspecting to be engaged in piracy.

UNCLOS defines the high seas, for the purposes of acts of piracy, as those waters which lie beyond the seaward limit (generally 12 miles) of the territorial sea. Acts within the territorial sea which would be regarded as piracy if committed on the high sea are treated as ‘*armed robbery at sea*’ and are subject to the primary jurisdiction of the coastal state in which the acts take place.

As I say, the provisions on piracy apply only on the high seas and not within territorial waters where ‘*armed robbery at sea*’ is exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the coastal state. UNCLOS does not permit seizure of a pirate ship and arrest of the pirates in the territorial sea unless the ship flies the flag of that state. The theory is that the power to seize ships and pirates only on the high seas, now enshrined in UNCLOS, ensures that coastal states, which have exclusive jurisdiction within their own territorial waters, will be able effectively to control unlawful acts within those waters. This is not always the case. Somalia itself is an example. This problem has been partly solved in the case of Somalia by UN Resolutions which, in broad terms, allow States to treat acts of piracy committed within Somali territorial waters as though they were committed on the high seas.

Whilst rights to board, search and seize foreign ships and persons on board exist under international law under UNCLOS, the prosecution of pirates is subject to national law. It is therefore essential that the rights given under international law are implemented by national legislation so that national courts are able to deal efficiently with those arrested and accused of crimes at sea. Art. 100 places a duty on States to cooperate in the repression of piracy which would involve States making arrangements to transfer suspected pirates from the arresting ship to another State for prosecution. Very few States have accepted the UNCLOS mandate and legislated specifically against piracy. In this context I should mention that in August 2007 CMI submitted to the IMO Legal Committee a paper entitled ‘Maritime Criminal Acts-draft Guidelines for National Legislation’. (LEG 93/12/1). It was suggested by CMI that States with an inadequate national law on maritime criminal acts including piracy might, when carrying out a review of their national legislation, find the guidelines a useful “toolkit” from which to draft their new legislation. The Legal Committee decided to note the terms of the CMI submission but not to take the matter any further at that time.

The reasons for the reluctance of States to embrace the rights created by UNCLOS to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction over pirates are essentially political but also economic. An example is Kenya which for a period was willing to accept the rendition of pirates and to prosecute them. But without international funding, its willingness to devote its own resources to the project soon ended. With some exceptions, other States have shown no particular enthusiasm to step into the breach. However, as we shall see later, it would not be right to assume that pirates are not being prosecuted.

Piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction and pirates are criminals. However, they are not necessarily ‘individuals taking a direct part in hostilities’ in an armed conflict. This means that they cannot be targeted with lethal force. Nor are pirates necessarilyterrorists.

**How do matters stand today?**

It is against this rather gloomy background that I would like to review the legal, practical and political response since October 2010. Piracy remains a pressing problem. To illustrate the scale of the issue, some statistics:

1. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) quarterly report, as of 30 June 2012[[1]](#endnote-1) Somali pirates are currently holding 11 vessels with 188 hostages captive. Despite the noticeable decline in Somali piracy this year[[2]](#endnote-2), the IMB has stated that Somali piracy remains a serious threat.
2. 439 attacks were reported to the IMB in 2011 of which 275 took place off Somalia on the east coast and in the Gulf of Guinea on the west coast of Africa. This was a slight drop, compared to the 445 recorded incidents of piracy and armed robbery in 2010[[3]](#endnote-3). Ransoms of US$160m were paid in 2011 to release 31 hijacked ships[[4]](#endnote-4).
3. Piracy cost the shipping industry and governments between US$ 6.6bn and US$6.9bn last year, including US$2.7bn in extra fuel and US$1.3bn on military operations[[5]](#endnote-5). As I have said, the shipping industry paid Somali pirates US$160m in ransoms last year, with the average ransom being US$5m[[6]](#endnote-6).
4. Although the number of seafarers taken hostage in 2011 was down to 555 from 645 in 2010, captives were held for 50% longer in 2011 (an average of eight months) and the violence faced by seafarers has not subsided[[7]](#endnote-7). All hostages were subject to deprivation and unacceptable conditions when held by Somali pirates; 149 hostages have been held for more than a year and 35 victims have died at the hands of pirates last year[[8]](#endnote-8).
5. The IMB has also recently reported that there has been a worrying increase in piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea: 40 incidents (including ten hijackings) have so far been reported in 2012, compared to 25 in 2011.[[9]](#endnote-9)

Recent press reports might have given the impression that the level of piracy is decreasing. Certainly it seems that attacks have shown a decrease in 2012. Experts suggest that the poor cashflow is limiting pirate activity but there are other contributing factors I shall return to later. Cash flow is certainly a significant issue and may explain why one gang executed a hostage from the “ORNA” which was hijacked on 20 December 2010. Pirates have often threatened to kill crew members and a number of crew members have died in captivity but this is the first time since 2007 that a murder has been used as a negotiating tactic by pirates.

Certainly for the past three months pirate activity in the Indian Ocean has been at an all-time low. In August and September not a single commercial vessel was attacked, while only two fishing dhows were attacked in August and just one last month.

However the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) has said the capability of the pirates worldwide is actually greater than it has ever been. Public perception that piracy is exclusively a Somali problem is certainly not accurate. There has been a noticeable and worrying increase in attacks off the West coast of Africa. Additionally, some attacks by Somali pirates have taken place closer to India than to Somalia. The use of “mother” ships has meant that Somali pirates have a large area of operations to include waters off Kenya, the Seychelles, Madagascar, the Maldives, Oman, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The IMB current Bulletin identifies as places where piracy is a risk: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malacca Straits, Singapore Straits, South China Sea, Nigeria, Benin, Gulf of Aden / Red Sea, Somalia and Ecuador.

Some recent piracy cases include:

1. “FREE GODDESS” was hijacked by Somali pirates off the coast of Oman on 8 February 2012 and was still listed as a casualty on 8 October.
2. “ROYAL GRACE” was hijacked by pirates off the coast of Oman on 2 March 2012 and was still being held by pirates as at 8 October 2012.
3. “BW RHINE” was hijacked off the coast of Togo after its automatic identification system was switched off on 28 April 2012. The vessel was released by 4 May 2012 but the pirates stole some of the vessel’s cargo of gasoline.
4. “JASCON 33” was attacked off the coast of Nigeria on 4 August 2012. Two naval guards were killed and four foreign nationals were kidnapped and released on 24 August 2012. Two other security guards onboard were injured during the attack and taken to Port Harcourt for treatment.
5. The “ANUKET EMERALD”, “ENERGY CENTURION” and “ABU DHABI STAR” were all hijacked by pirates seeking to steal the vessel’s oil in the Gulf of Guinea during August and September 2012. The crew on board the “ENERGY CENTURION” and the “ANUKET EMERALD” were released after the cargo was removed. A Nigerian naval vessel intercepted “ABU DHABI STAR” and the pirates jumped ship.

**The International response**

At the public international level States have continued with practical efforts to respond to the threat. Much of these are well known, for example the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA, established by EUNAVFOR), the 490 miles Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC) operated by independent navies from countries such as Russia, China, India and Japan or the group transit system operated by EUNAVFOR.

Three anti-piracy task forces have been assembled:

1. EUNAVFOR Somalia (“Operation Atalanta”)
	* Established by the European Union in November 2008[[10]](#endnote-10), which became operational in December 2008.
	* Mandate renewed by Council Decision 210/766/CFSP until 12 December 2012. Member States have indicated their willingness to extend it further, to December 2014.
	* Patrols an area extending from the Gulf of Aden and coast of Somalia to South of the Red Sea and into the Western Indian Ocean - an area of 2 million square nautical miles.
	* On average, the force consists of 5-10 surface combat vessels, 1-2 auxiliary ships, 2-4 patrol and reconnaissance aircraft and 1500 military personnel.
2. NATO’s “Operation Ocean Shield”
	* Deterrence patrols and escorts provided by NATO pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolutions.
	* Replaced “Operation Allied Provider” (commenced October 2008) and “Operation Allied Protector” (commenced March 2009) in August 2009.
	* At-sea counter piracy operations and escorts off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden.
	* Assists regional states, on their request, to develop their own counter-piracy abilities and activities.
	* EUNAVFOR and Operation Ocean Shield operate from the same headquarters in Northwood, UK.
	* Participants include Italy, the USA and Portugal.
3. Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)
	* Formerly the Maritime Coalition.
	* A multi-national naval coalition formed under the auspices of the UN Security Council Resolutions.
	* Up to 36 ships available from 25 Member States (but not all necessarily deployed at the same time).
	* Patrol an area of more than 2.5m square nautical miles, from the Strait of Hormuz to the Suez Canal, and from Pakistan to Kenya.
	* Member States include Canada, the UK, Germany, France, Korea, the USA, Italy and Spain.
	* In addition individual states, for example China, India and Russia, may also send military vessels without coming within one of these larger organisations.

One of the reasons that the IMB believes there has been a reduced number of successful Somali hijackings is the efforts and actions of the naval forces, which have harassed the mother vessels and pirate action groups.

At the same time, in cooperation with States the shipping industry has developed Best Management Practice guidelines (latest version BMP4) to minimise the risk of pirate attack.

**The Political response**

Turning now from practical to political measures:

On 21 February 2012, the Foreign Secretary announced that the UK would be establishing a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution & Intelligence Coordination Centre (RAPPICC) in the Seychelles. The centre will target the “kingpins” of piracy creating evidence packages that can be used to prosecute them in the region. This unique function will support the regional capacity to tackle serious organised crime in Somalia. A number of states expressed an interest in being involved, including the Seychelles, the US, the Netherlands, INTERPOL, Mauritius, Norway, Tanzania, Australia, the UAE and EUNAVFOR. The construction work began on 13 August 2012 and the centre is due to open in January 2013.

On 23rd February 2012 the UK hosted a one day meeting with leaders from more than 50 countries and international organizations which focused on a range of actions in relation to security but also dealt with the issue of piracy. Some of the main points agreed in relation to piracy were:

* + A Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Tanzania to transfer suspected pirates to Tanzania for prosecution (the UK wants other states in the region to sign up to similar agreements).
	+ Somaliland signed an agreement with the Seychelles to transfer convicted pirates to prisons in Somaliland. The plan – supported by the British government – is to set up a “conveyor belt”, where pirates are tried in the Seychelles judicial system before being sent to a UN-backed prison in Somalia.
	+ The UK announced the creation of an international task force – the Ransom Task Force (RTF) - (made up of 14 countries representing a range of Flag States) on pirate ransoms to understand better the ransom business cycle and how to break it.

The RTF met for the first time on 30 May 2012 to discuss issues relating to preventing ransoms and on 12 September 2012 to discuss avoiding the payment of ransoms/alternative strategies to paying ransoms. The final meeting will look at other options for reducing the size/frequency of ransom payments. It is understood that the RTF will then agree and announce a final series of recommendations for the international community.It expects to complete its work by year end.

The report is likely to focus particularly on a proposal to ban the payment of ransoms to pirates. This has been criticised by both the British Chamber of Shipping and the trade union Nautilus, who have lobbied the UK government to allow commercial organizations to pay ransoms at their own discretion. According to the British Chamber of Shipping, banning ransoms will not stop people paying them and the concept of letting seafarers die to deter pirates is both unrealistic and unacceptable given lives are at stake.

Whilst all this activity is going on ransoms continue to be paid - in fact the average ransom payment increased from US$4m in 2010 to US$5m in 2011[[11]](#endnote-11). The ICS has also discouraged any further idea of prohibiting or criminalizing ransom payments since the primary concern of the industry was to the crews and their families. Further, the criminalising or prohibiting payments could lead many in the industry to refuse to sail in the affected danger area which could have significant implications for a large portion of world trade. 40% of world oil shipments for example, are transported via the Western Indian Ocean. Although a US Presidential Executive Order of 13th April 2010 made it an offence to pay a ransom to certain specific groups of pirates, this approach has not been followed by other states. In England, the payment of a ransom has been held not to be contrary to public policy (*Masefield AG v. Amlin Corporate Member Ltd., The Bunga Melati Dua [2011] EWCA Civ 24*), thereby easing any difficulties in making claims under policies of insurance subject to English law.

In another very interesting development, a request was submitted by Ukraine to the IMO (LEG99/7/1) at the 99th session of the Legal Committee on 16-20th April 2012 for information on the apprehension of pirates which operate in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Northern Indian Ocean. The request was made on the basis that the prosecution of pirates had long been viewed as a complicated problem. The data provided would enable the IMO Legal Committee to make an informed decision on further steps to improve the legislative framework to combat piracy and armed robbery. The IMO response from data obtained from a report of the United Nations Secretary-General (S/2012/50) was that 20 States were prosecuting acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and the total number of prosecutions which had taken place so far was 1,063. Interestingly, the UK has not prosecuted any of the pirates detained by naval vessels. Meanwhile, Kenya has held 143, convicting 50; and the USA has held 28, convicting 17.

The IMO is planning to undertake a study to consolidate information regarding court decisions resulting from piracy prosecutions so that it is publicly available on the IMO website.

The second UAE Marine Counter-Piracy Conference took place in Dubai in June 2012. The Conference welcomed the significant progress made in combating piracy on land and in the waters off the coast of Somalia in the year since the inaugural conference in April 2011. The Conference reaffirmed its commitment to strengthening public-private partnerships in the search for a sustainable solution to the violence. The Conference also emphasized the importance of state building and harmonization with local governments and other agencies to counter the destabilizing impact of piracy. A declaration was adopted by foreign ministers and senior government officials from 41 countries, as well as representatives from UN agencies, including the IMO, and top executives from 73 leading maritime companies and organisations. The Conference expressed backing for a UAE proposal to make the UN Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States to Counter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (affiliated to the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia) the central manager for new funds donated towards the development of Somalia’s maritime security capacity. The UAE also made an initial pledge of US$1m towards this new initiative within the Trust Fund.

Apart from this diplomatic activity, there have been other relevant political developments. The UK government formally endorsed the use of armed guards on 30 October 2011, when the Prime Minister announced ships sailing under the British flag would be allowed to carry armed guards to protect themselves from pirates. The announcement was in direct contrast with previous government policy, which strongly discouraged the use of armed guards. However, the Prime Minister stressed that the placing of armed guards on board commercial vessels was only a short-term measure and not a long-term solution to the piracy problem. I shall return to the issue of armed guards later.

I should also mention that in June 2012, the Cypriot House of Representatives approved a new counter-piracy Bill, which makes Cyprus one of the first EU countries specifically to authorize the use of force. The new laws underline the authority of the master and forbid armed guards to use their weapons without the explicit order or permission of the master. It also regulates the licensing of Private Maritime Security Contractors (PMSCs).

**Industry response – Civil law**

I would like now to look at the industry response. Despite all this activity, there remains an uneasy feeling that enough is still not being done to rein in the problem of piracy. Many Owners are resorting to hiring PMSCs to deploy armed guards on board their vessels. The use of PMSCs has increased as a response to the fact that the task forces have not to date proved to be entirely successful. The reality is that there are too few ships covering too large an area. More importantly some vessels remain uniquely vulnerable to pirate attacks: those with a low freeboard, low speed, small crew, poor manoeuvrability. Further, the cost of piracy is rising in terms of ransom payments, the economic cost of the time during which a vessel is held and insurance costs. Last but most important is the humanitarian cost of piracy is becoming more prominent and Owners want to protect their crew.

The International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) spoke out publicly at its annual conference in September 2011 in support of armed guards. The major reason for doing so was that no vessel with armed guards has been hijacked. It came to light in Lloyd’s List (after the IUMI gave its seal of approval) that insurers were offering a 35% discount for transits in the “High Risk Area” (this areas includes the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea around the Somali coast) that were carrying armed guards. As already noted, the UK Government also followed this lead with its measured endorsement of the use of armed guards. Now Belgium, Italy and Germany are all making legislative moves to approve armed guards. From the most recent quarterly report of the IMB there is some evidence that the preventative measures taken by merchant vessels, including the use of citadels and employment of armed guards and PMSCs, has also been a factor in the recent reduction of successful hijackings off Somalia.

The extent to which PMSCs armed or unarmed had been used prior to 2011 is unclear. However, it is perhaps fair to say that the use of passive measures was the norm. These included: Water Cannon; Sonic Devices (Long Range Acoustic Device LRAD)[[12]](#endnote-12):; trailing lines; barbed / razor Wire: recommended by BMP along with placing dummy lookouts; Citadels / Safe Rooms[[13]](#endnote-13). The problem with passive measures is illustrated clearly in the case of the “BISCAGLIA” in November 2008: an unarmed 3 man security team could not repel a hijack by pirates with the use of water cannons and a LRAD.

The Shipping industry has recognised that an increasing number of Owners and Operators wish to deploy armed guards on board their vessels but made clear that deployment of armed guards is a matter for each individual Owner:

* + IMO: “*a decision for the individual shipowner after a thorough risk assessment and after ensuring all other practical means of self protection have been employed*”.
	+ BMP4: “*a matter for individual shipowners to decide following their own voyage risk assessment and approval of respective Flag States*”.

BMP4 does not contain a specific endorsement of their use: *“this advice does not constitute a recommendation or an endorsement of the general use of armed Private Maritime Security Contractors*”.

However, the use of armed guards and PMSCs raises its own issues. Obviously, there are practical questions such as having appropriate licenses for weapons on board from the flag state and ports at which the ship calls. At the heart of the issue is the use of force. The rules that will be applied to when weapons can be used will depend on among other possible laws, the law of the flag state, the law of the state where the Owners are incorporated or have their commercial seat, and the law of the states where the vessel will call. In the UK, lethal force is only allowed where there is a serious and imminent threat to life. The decision to use lethal force must be reasonable and the force used must be proportionate. The dangers are all too obvious. On 15 February 2012, two Italian marines on the “ENRICA LEXIE” shot dead two Indian fishermen, whom they believed were pirates. The two armed guards are currently being held by Kochi City Police, India. Italy has agreed to pay US$ 192,000 in compensation to the families of the two fishermen (these payments will not affect the pending legal action against the two guards who have been charged with murder).

At the moment PMSCs sign up to the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) and other accreditation or vetting procedures on a purely voluntary basis. However, the intention is to take the guidelines from the ICOC and use them to produce a more formal oversight for PMSCs.

In the meantime, however, BIMCO has created Guardcon, a standard contract for employing security guards on vessels. This was launched in March 2012, to take the lead in giving shipowners and PMSCs guidance on the employment and use of security guards, with or without firearms, on merchant vessels. It seeks to set an industry standard for governing relationships between the shipowner and the PMSCs as well as the master and on-board security guards. Although it is not a cure-all and should not be seen as the long-term solution, it does offer clarity on certain issues. For example, BIMCO has also published guidance on the use of force to accompany Guardcon. The desired template is for providing a layered defence, with lethal force being a last resort to be used in exceptional circumstances. The Master has overall authority and has the right to order a cease fire. This reaffirms the SOLAS position that the Master has absolute authority as to the safety of the vessel, her cargo, and her crew. However, certain issues do arise as to the authority of the Master where armed guards are deployed:

* The decision to open fire, according to Guardcon, is given to the PMSC team leader. Therefore, the Master can only decide to stop the firing – by which point the damage may have been done.
* In reality, the Master may not have authority because if there is an exchange of fire and the Master is in the citadel, he may not be in a position to control the situation.

In September 2012, INTERTANKO endorsed Guardcon as a model contract and it seems Guardcon can move towards becoming an industry standard.

I should note here that in May 2012, at the 90th session of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in London, between 16 and 20 May 2012, the MSC agreed on interim guidance on PMSCs including, but without endorsing this, the use of armed guards. Additionally, interim guidance for flag states was also approved, which provides measures to prevent and mitigate Somalia-based piracy; listing recommended practices that flag states are encouraged to apply, taking into account national laws of flag states, to maximize efforts on counter-piracy measures being implemented.

Finally, I should mention the Convoy Escort Programme (CEP). The CEP is a plan by London market insurers to set up a private fleet of armed patrol boats in the Gulf of Aden to provide protection for vessels, whilst also reducing the costs of insuring vessels, cargo and crews against the risk of attacks by pirates. The CEP Package includes an escort service, insurance cover and an audit of the vessel’s BMP4. Under the plan, the CEP would control a fleet of vessels with fixed gun positions and armed crews authorized to engage the pirates. It is currently in the process of raising finance from investors. However, it has courted much controversy within the shipping industry because it is seen by many as a private army for hire.

**Closing remarks**

I hope this review has been helpful. I should add that it is not intended to be exhaustive. Although there have been continuous political efforts through IMO and by States to tackle piracy, these remain of uncertain effect. The most significant development has been the growing tacit or overt support for PMSCs and armed response. According to IMO, anecdotal evidence suggests that up to 25% of ships are carrying firearms when transiting the Gulf of Aden. This development and the efforts of the various naval detachments do appear finally to have had some impact on the frequency of attacks off Somalia. However, the long term effect on the incidence of piracy of the presence of armed PMSCs cannot be known. Armed guards can only be a supplementary measure to protect seafarers, vessels and cargoes. They do not solve the underlying problems that create piracy. Furthermore, many other practical and legal issues arise such as the wrongful use of force, the authority of the Master and insurance cover. The key to winning the battle is breaking the financial chain to financiers investing in piracy, successfully prosecuting pirates captured by the naval task forces, and greater political will and stability in the regions affected, particularly in Somalia. The report in July that a pirate “war lord” had been provided with diplomatic immunity by the President of Somalia emphasizes the scale of the task ahead.

Andrew Taylor[[14]](#endnote-14)

October 2012

1. ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period of 1 January – 30 June 2012. This is the most current IMB report published and available at the time of writing on 8 October 2012. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Incidents of Somali piracy activity dropped from 163 in the first six months of 2011 to 69 in 2012 - IMB Piracy Reporting Centre [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. IMB figures according to IMB Annual Report of 2011. IMO’s figures diverge from these. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. One Earth Future Foundation Report - The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. One Earth Future Foundation Report - The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Oceans Beyond Piracy - The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Oceans Beyond Piracy – The Human Cost of Piracy 2011. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Oceans Beyond Piracy – The Human Cost of Piracy 2011. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report for the period of 1 January – 30 June 2012. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. One Earth Future Foundation Report - The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. this was used by “SEABOURN SPIRIT” to repel pirates in November 2005, although the actual effectiveness of the LRAD was unknown. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. the “MONTECRISTO” crew barricaded themselves into their citadel when attacked by pirates in October 2011 until being rescued by the Navy. Imabari Shipbuilding in Japan recently unveiled a new ship design which incorporates a citadel facility protected by security doors, bullet-proof windows and water canons. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Executive Councillor of CMI and a partner of Reed Smith. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)